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Comment
STILL STANDING, BARELY:
BANK OF AMERICA CORP. V. CITY OF MIAMI
AND THE IMPACT ON FAIR LENDING LITIGATION
TREVOR C. HOFFBERGER ∗
In the mid-1990s, changes in the mortgage lending market created new
and harmful disparities for minorities in the United States.1 While access to
mortgages increased in the 1990s, both the secondary mortgage market and
the use of automated credit scoring set the stage for discriminatory and unfavorable loan terms. 2 The development of the subprime mortgage market—involving higher costs and riskier terms for borrowers—enabled financial institutions to issue mortgages “without regard to the borrower’s
ability to afford them.” 3 These practices disproportionately affected minority communities; black and Hispanic borrowers were more than twice as
likely to obtain a subprime loan than were non-Hispanic white borrowers. 4
Consequently, these borrowers were significantly more likely to face mortgage foreclosure. 5 In late 2009, subprime loans were past due at three times
the rate of the national average of all mortgages, and lenders commenced
foreclosure at over double the rate. 6 Foreclosure rates in neighborhoods of
major American cities skyrocketed, creating costs not only for the cities’
residents, but for the cities themselves. 7
© 2019 Trevor C. Hoffberger.
∗
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1. ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 351–58 (3d ed. 2015).
2. Id. at 351–52.
3. Id. at 352.
4. Id. at 354. One study indicates that even when “controlling for income, credit score, loan
to value and property locations, borrowers of color were about 30 percent more likely to receive
higher cost loans than similarly risky White borrowers.” Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., FY 2010 BUDGET: ROAD MAP FOR TRANSFORMATION 5 (2009),
https://archives.hud.gov/budget/fy10/fy10budget.pdf).
5. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 357.
6. Id.
7. See id. (“To the extent that subprime mortgages are clustered in particular, often minority
areas, disproportionately high rates of foreclosure can harm entire neighborhoods, contributing to
property abandonment, diminished property values, and crime.”).
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In Baltimore City, unfair lending practices both capitalize on and exacerbate the effects of historical housing discrimination. Local and federal
housing policy each have contributed to the racial and economic segregation of Baltimore’s neighborhoods. 8 As early as 1911, Baltimore Mayor J.
Barry Mahool imposed the nation’s first segregation ordinance; it prevented
citizens from living, attending school, or observing religion on the same
block as a person of a different race. 9 When the United States Supreme
Court declared such ordinances unconstitutional, 10 Baltimore officials
formed a Committee on Segregation to cultivate and encourage racially restrictive covenants in white neighborhoods. 11 Meanwhile, national professional and government policies aggravated these discriminatory effects.
The National Association of Real Estate’s 1924 Code of Ethics required a
realtor to “never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individual whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in
that neighborhood.” 12 Baltimore neighborhoods also felt the effects of the
Federal Housing Administration’s “redlining” practices. 13 In an effort to
promote homeownership by insuring private mortgages, the agency ranked
neighborhoods on a map based on the risk of potential loans. 14 In doing so,
however, the agency ranked predominantly black neighborhoods lowest and
colored them red. 15 As a result, mortgage funds diverted away from black
neighborhoods, significantly impeding homeownership. 16
Subprime mortgage lending, furthermore, constitutes “reverse redlining” wherein financial institutions target minority neighborhoods when issuing predatory and unfair mortgage loans, perpetuating racial and econom-

8. See generally ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A
GREAT AMERICAN CITY (2010).
9. Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of
1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 289 (1983).
10. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding a similar Louisville ordinance unconstitutional).
11. Garrett Power, Meade v. Dennistone: The NAACP’s Test Case to “. . . Sue Jim Crowe out
of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amendment,” 63 MD. L. REV. 773, 792 (2004) (“The Committee
on Segregation undertook to encourage neighbors, government officials, and real estate agents to
use restrictive covenants, peer pressure, harassment, and suasion to promote de facto segregation.”).
12. CODE OF ETHICS art. 34 (1924) (NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE BDS., revised 1928).
13. See PIETILA, supra note 8, at 72.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 70–73 (describing redlining practices beginning with the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation through the Federal Housing Administration).
16. See id. at 73 (“This encouraged further redlining by banks, insurance companies, and
other businesses, thereby dooming older city neighborhoods to advancing decay, particularly if
they were black or mixed race.”).
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ic divides. 17 In Baltimore, for example, Wells Fargo Bank issued high-cost
loans to forty-three percent of its black customers in 2007, but only nine
percent of white customers. 18 The bank’s deceptive practices included
steering minorities into subprime loans when they otherwise qualified for a
prime loan. 19 Such practices led to disproportionate foreclosure rates in
Baltimore’s black neighborhoods, where foreclosures occurred at nearly
three times the rate of white neighborhoods. 20 Due to these foreclosures,
black neighborhoods saw a drastic increase in vacant properties.21
In areas where financial distress leaves properties vacant, municipal
costs are particularly high. 22 Basic vacant property foreclosures might cost
a city over $400 in foreclosure inspections and proceedings. 23 These costs,
however, can multiply if the homeowner disappears before the foreclosure
process is complete. 24 Uncollected bills and taxes, property maintenance,
and legal processes can bring municipal expenses to over $19,000 per property. 25 In expenses connected directly to foreclosure proceedings, vacant
properties can create additional expenses and headaches for local governments. 26 Vacant properties in Baltimore demand municipal expenses for
inspection, blocking entrances, cutting grass, prosecuting code violations,
and making structural repairs. 27 Vacant buildings can cause surrounding
property to decline in value, 28 which means that the city collects decreased

17. Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2,
Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2018).
18. Id. at 28. High-cost loans are “loans with an interest rate that was at least three percentage points above a federally-established benchmark.” Id.
19. Id. at 23–26.
20. Id. at 18. The foreclosure rate in majority-white neighborhoods was 1.63% compared to
4.82% in majority-black neighborhoods. Id.
21. Id. at 44–45 (“In majority African-American neighborhoods, 270 of the Wells Fargo
foreclosure properties became vacant after Wells Fargo made the loan.”).
22. WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRES. FOUND., COLLATERAL
DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF TODAY’S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM 12 (2005) (“In
the simplest cases, the unit transfers smoothly from the borrower into the portfolio of the noteholder or to a foreclosure investor. . . . If the unit becomes vacant, however, the City’s foreclosure
costs mount rapidly.”).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 14–15.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 15 (estimating that “abandoned properties damaged by fire” can cost a city nearly
$35,000); NAT’L VACANT PROPERTIES CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COSTS TO
COMMUNITIES (2005).
27. See Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 17, at 45.
28. See NAT’L VACANT PROPERTIES CAMPAIGN, supra note 26, at 9 (noting that in Philadelphia, “houses within 150 feet of a vacant or abandoned property experienced a net loss of
$7,627”).
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tax revenue for nearby properties as well.29 Lower property values can lead
to a “spiral of blight” that includes population loss, arson, and crime. 30
Given the limited capacity of individuals to hold lending institutions
accountable for discriminatory practices, municipalities have attempted to
take the wheel. The outcome in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 31 though
not a housing-related case, made it virtually impossible to bring a class action suit for disparate impact. In Dukes, 1.5 million female employees of
Wal-Mart filed a class action suit, alleging that the corporation systematically discriminated against women while making wage and promotional decisions. 32 The Supreme Court held, however, that the class of plaintiffs
failed to meet the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; as a result, the class could not be certified
and the merits of the case went unaddressed. 33 The Court explained that
absent “proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy,”
the class could not assert they had suffered a common injury. 34
Because of individuals’ limited capacity to challenge discriminatory
lending practices through class action, cities have taken on a larger role in
that battle. The first major breakthrough occurred when the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore was granted standing under the Fair Housing Act 35
(“FHA” or “the Act”) against Wells Fargo. 36 This procedural victory and
ensuing settlement led to a host of additional municipal claims against lenders. Memphis 37 and other cities followed Baltimore’s lead, and eventual
plaintiffs included Atlanta, 38 Los Angeles, 39 Miami Gardens, 40 and Cook
County, Illinois. 41
29. Id.
30. Id. at 12 (describing the “cumulative impact of vacant property”); APGAR & DUDA, supra
note 22, at 9 (“Complicating matters is the fact that nonprime foreclosures tend to cluster in ways
that generate significant spillover effects as vacant properties become magnets for crime and other
social ills.”).
31. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
32. Id. at 343 (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the company discriminated against them on the basis
of their sex by denying them equal pay or promotions, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.”).
33. Id. at 359; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (2018) (“One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: . . . there are questions of law or
fact common to the class.”).
34. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§3601–3619 (2012).
36. Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, at *1 (D.
Md. Apr. 22, 2018); see also infra notes 115–117 (describing Baltimore’s litigation and the district court’s reasoning).
37. City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo, No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL 1706756, at *1 (W.D.
Tenn. May 4, 2011) (holding that the City both had standing and had stated an adequate disparate
impact claim under the FHA).
38. E.g., DeKalb Cty. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-03640-ELR, 2015 WL
8699229, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2015).
39. City of L.A. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
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In 2017, the City of Miami became the first of these cities to reach the
United States Supreme Court in a fair lending dispute. Bank of America
Corp. v. City of Miami 42 asked the Court to decide (1) whether the City had
standing to sue under the FHA, and (2) whether the City’s alleged injuries
met proximate cause standards.43 While the Court did grant standing to the
City, it disagreed with the lower court’s use of foreseeability alone when
evaluating proximate cause. 44 Section I.A of this Comment will describe
the history of the FHA and its applicability to discriminatory lending. 45
Sections I.B and I.C will detail statutory standing and proximate cause
standards, respectively, with a particular focus on FHA contexts. 46 Section
I.D will discuss the Court’s reasoning in the City of Miami, 47 followed by
analyses of each issue on remand in Sections II.A and II.B. 48 Finally, in
Section II.C, the Comment will conclude with the options facing municipalities following the decision. 49
I. BACKGROUND
The issues raised in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami rest at the
intersection of political initiatives, social concerns, and legal precedent.
The City brought a statutory claim under the FHA, federal legislation that
Section I.A explains. 50 In order to have standing and advance to discovery,
the City needed to adequately plead that the alleged violations—
discriminatory mortgage lending practices—fell within protections granted
by the FHA. 51 Section I.B provides historical perspective behind this issue,
tracing the Supreme Court’s decisions on constitutional, prudential, and
statutory standing. 52 Furthermore, Section I.C outlines case law surrounding proximate cause. 53 While the Supreme Court has repeatedly used foreseeability and directness as benchmarks for pleading causation, lower courts
40. E.g., City of Miami Gardens v. Wells Fargo, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
41. Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am. Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 513 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Cty. of Cook v.
HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d 952 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo
& Co., 115 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
42. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
43. Id. at 1301.
44. Id.
45. See infra Section I.A.
46. See infra Sections I.B (statutory standing), I.C (proximate cause).
47. See infra Section I.D.
48. See infra Sections II.A (analyzing the Court’s ruling on standing), II.B (analyzing the
Court’s ruling on proximate cause).
49. See infra Section II.C.
50. See infra Section I.A.
51. See infra Section I.B.
52. See infra Sections I.B.1 (Article III standing), I.B.2 (prudential requirements), I.B.3 (statutory standing).
53. See infra Section I.C.
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have not been clear on how these standards apply to fair housing disputes. 54
Finally, Section I.D summarizes the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in City of Miami. 55
A. FHA and Discriminatory Mortgage Lending
In 1968, Congress passed the FHA, codified as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. 56 While Congress failed to agree on the bill’s language
for two years, President Lyndon B. Johnson was able to move the FHA
through Congress following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
in April 1968. 57 In addition to Dr. King’s influence on fair housing legislation prior to his death, 58 the FHA was motivated by the ongoing housing
discrimination against minority infantrymen returning from Vietnam. 59 The
Act’s legislative purpose was to “provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States.” 60 Additionally, the legislative hearings for the FHA indicate that Congress intended to protect not only the direct victims of racial discrimination, but also “those who were not
the direct objects of discrimination [who] had an interest in ensuring fair
housing, as they too suffered.” 61
The FHA prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 62 Protections under the
FHA extend to the sale, rental, and advertising of homes; the Act also prohibits inducing a buyer or renter based on the prospective entry of a particular group to a neighborhood. 63 Regarding mortgage lending, the FHA has
provided a basis for claims against unfair lending practices through its prohibitions against discriminatory real estate transactions. 64 The Act defines
54. See infra Sections I.C.1 (Supreme Court on proximate cause), I.C.2 (lower court applications).
55. See infra Section I.D.
56. 42 U.S.C § 3601–3619 (2012).
57. See History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited
Sept. 15, 2018).
58. Id. (“Since the 1966 open housing marches in Chicago, Dr. King’s name had been closely
associated with the fair housing legislation. President Johnson viewed the Act as a fitting memorial to the man’s life work, and wished to have the Act passed prior to Dr. King’s funeral in Atlanta.”).
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
61. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (citing Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 1358, S.
2114, and S. 2280, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
63. Id. § 3604(e).
64. Id. § 3605(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity . . . to discriminate
against any person in making available [a residential real estate] transaction, or in the terms or
conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or
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transactions as “[t]he making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance” for the purchase or security of residential real estate.65
Accordingly, courts have permitted municipal and county governments to
submit claims against financial institutions for unfair mortgage lending
practices. 66
B. Courts Typically Grant Standing Broadly Under the FHA
A plaintiff’s claim under the FHA must meet the requirements set by
both Article III of the Constitution and those set by the judiciary’s prudential considerations.67 While Article III limits the Court’s jurisdiction to
“cases” or “controversies,” 68 the Court imposes additional, prudential requirements to “avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.” 69 This Section examines the Supreme Court’s approach to standing in housing contexts.
1.

Injuries from FHA Violations Meet Article III Standing
Requirements

Constitutional standing under Article III limits claims to actual “cases”
or “controversies.” 70 A case or controversy requires that (1) the plaintiff
suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s
conduct; and (3) the injury will likely be redressed by the requested relief. 71
Furthermore, while “it does not suffice if the injury complained of is ‘th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court,’

national origin.”); see also File a Complaint, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/online-complaint (last visited
Sept. 15, 2018).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b).
66. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (holding that a city has
standing to sue a bank for discriminatory mortgage lending under the FHA); City of L.A. v. Wells
Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (permitting the municipality to recover under
the FHA for discriminatory lending practices); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp.
3d 975 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that the County was entitled to redress for certain damages resulting from the bank’s discriminatory mortgage lending); Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings
Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (same); Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2018) (denying the financial institution’s
motion to dismiss the City’s FHA claim for discriminatory lending).
67. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (“This [standing] inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise . . . .”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
69. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99–100.
70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
71. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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that does not exclude injury produced by determinative or coercive effect
upon the action of someone else.” 72
In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 73 the Supreme Court
was asked to determine whether a group of plaintiffs—a village, four white
residents, a black resident, and a black resident of a neighboring municipality—had Article III standing. The plaintiffs sued a group of realtors under
the FHA for “racial steering” practices. 74 Namely, the realtors allegedly
steered potential black buyers to an integrated neighborhood and potential
white buyers away from the same area.75 The plaintiffs’ claimed injuries
consisted of detrimental economic manipulations of their neighborhoods
and the lost “benefits of living in an integrated society.” 76 The Supreme
Court held that the Village of Bellwood satisfied Article III standing because it may have endured both a “significant reduction in property values”
and racial stability as a result of the defendants’ practices. 77
2.

The Court Typically Interprets Prudential Standing Broadly
Under the FHA

In addition to constitutional standing, a plaintiff alleging a FHA violation must also meet prudential standing requirements. 78 Prudential standing
requirements ensure that courts are not burdened with adjudicating a “‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens.” 79 Where the Court is particularly concerned with a plaintiff’s ability to sue under a statute, however, it asks whether the plaintiff’s
asserted rights fall within the “zone of interests” that the statute intends to
protect. 80 As early as 1970, the Supreme Court in Ass’n of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp 81 referenced a “trend toward the enlargement of the class of people” who fall within the zone of interests of a given
statute. 82

72. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
73. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
74. Id. at 97.
75. Id. at 95.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 110.
78. Id. at 99–100 (“Even when a case falls within these constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff
may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual would be vindicated . . . .”).
79. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 176 (1974)).
80. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
81. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
82. Id. at 154.
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Specific to the FHA, a plaintiff must qualify as an “aggrieved person”
who the statute intended to protect. 83 The Act defines an aggrieved person
as a person who either “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice” or believes that an injury “is about to occur.” 84 The Supreme Court, furthermore, has interpreted the term “person” broadly in
standing contexts; the term has previously encompassed localities, 85 nonprofit agencies, 86 and spouses of discriminated people. 87
In the 1972 case Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 88 the
Court recognized that the FHA afforded protections not only to direct recipients of discrimination, but also to those who lost tangential benefits due to
the violation. In Trafficante, two tenants of an apartment complex—one
white tenant and one black tenant—sued their landlord for racially discriminatory practices against nonwhite renters. 89 The plaintiffs’ injuries included the lost benefits of living in an integrated community, lost business prospects of having diverse neighbors, and social and economic damages of
being stigmatized as living in a “white ghetto.” 90 The Supreme Court first
looked at the legislative history of the FHA, noting Senator Walter Mondale’s hope that indirect victims would also be protected. 91 Given this intent to promote integrated communities, the Court construed the language
broadly in order to “give[] standing to sue to all in the same housing unit
who are injured by racial discrimination.” 92 As a result, tenants of both races were granted statutory standing to sue under the FHA. 93
In 1982, the Court was asked to determine whether a nonprofit organization and two individually discriminated “testers” had standing to sue un-

83. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (2012) (“An aggrieved person may . . . file a complaint with the Secretary alleging [a] discriminatory housing practice.”).
84. Id. § 3602(i).
85. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94–95 (1979) (permitting
standing to a village, white residents, and a black resident in a “racial ‘steering’” claim that resulted in lost opportunity to in an integrated society); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165–66 (1997)
(granting standing to an irrigation district as “any person” under the Endangered Species Act).
86. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (allowing a nonprofit housing
organization to state an FHA claim for decreased ability to provide services to prospective homebuyers and increased expenses of combatting segregation).
87. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (permitting a husband’s Title VII
retaliation claim against his employer after he was fired following his wife’s gender discrimination complaint).
88. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
89. Id. at 207–08 (“The complaint alleged that the owner had discriminated against nonwhite
rental applicants in numerous ways, e.g., making it known to them that they would not be welcome at Parkmerced, manipulating the waiting list for apartments, delaying action on their applications, [and] using discriminatory acceptance standards.”).
90. Id. at 208.
91. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
92. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
93. Id.
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der the FHA in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. 94 In this case, the nonprofit hired two “tester plaintiffs”—one white individual and one black individual—to pose as interested renters of apartment units. 95 After the testers were given different information regarding the availability of apartment
units, the parties sued for discriminatory housing practices. 96 The nonprofit’s alleged injuries included a decreased ability to provide counseling and
referral services to its members “with a consequent drain on resources.”97
The Court looked to the similar facts in Gladstone, 98 where standing had
been granted “to the full limits of Art[icle] III.” 99 The nonprofit in Havens
was forced to devote significant resources to counteracting FHA violations,
which in turn decreased its capacity to provide its typical client services. 100
As a result, the Supreme Court gave the plaintiffs standing under the Act. 101
3. Statutory Standing Analyses Outside of the Housing Context
Help Inform the Reach of the FHA
In addition to FHA claims, the Supreme Court has been asked to assess statutory standing for persons aggrieved under other federal statutes.102
While these cases do not address fair lending violations, they inform the extent to which certain “persons” may fall within a statute’s zone of interests. 103 In Bennett v. Spear, 104 for example, irrigation districts and ranch
operators sued the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”). 105 The plaintiffs claimed that the agency’s mandate for minimum water levels failed to consider the economic interests of the affected
region, in violation of the statute. 106 While the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of standing, the Supreme Court
94. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
95. Id. at 368.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 369. The organization also asserted association standing on behalf of its members
who “had been deprived of the benefits of interracial association arising from living in an integrated community free of housing discrimination.” Id.
98. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
99. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979).
100. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379 (“Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s
activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than
simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”). The “tester” plaintiffs were
asked to amend their complaint in order to plead injuries with more particularity. Id. at 377–78.
101. Id. at 382.
102. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170
(2011).
103. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017) (citing Bennett
and Thompson as precedent for statutory standing analyses).
104. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
105. Id. at 159–60.
106. Id. at 160.
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reversed. Applying the zone of interests test, 107 the Court unanimously held
that the irrigation district and ranchers qualified as “any person” under the
ESA due to the purpose of the legislation (environmental protection for all)
and the purpose of the particular provision (enforcement by private attorneys general). 108
Finally, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 109 the Court assessed whether a husband’s retaliation claim fell within Title VII’s zone of
interests when he had been fired after his wife filed a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 110 Although
the plaintiff in this case was not alleging retaliation against the person who
had complained—his wife—the Supreme Court granted standing for his Title VII claim. The Court looked to the statutory language, specifically that
an action for retaliation may be brought by “a person claiming to be aggrieved.” 111 Recalling its previous broad interpretation of “person aggrieved” in Trafficante, 112 the Court in Thompson held that the husband’s
injury fell within the zone of interests protected by Title VII because the
employer intended to hurt the plaintiff’s wife by firing him. 113
4. Lower Courts Have Attempted to Apply Standing Requirements
to Fair Lending Cases
Specific to discriminatory lending suits under the FHA, lower courts
have attempted to incorporate Supreme Court precedent with both constitutional and statutory standing. In one of the first of such cases, Mayor of
Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 the City of Baltimore’s third
amended complaint survived a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that the City’s
alleged injuries—increased municipal expenses and decreased tax revenue—were “fairly traceable” to the banks’ alleged misconduct and, there-

107. See supra text accompanying note 80 (explaining that the zone of interests tests asks
whether the relevant statute intends to protect against the type of injury alleged).
108. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165.
109. 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
110. Id. at 172–73.
111. Id. at 173 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).
112. Id. at 176. It is worth noting that the Court considered the broadest interpretation of
“person” under Trafficante to be “ill-considered” dictum. Id. at 176. The Court warned that expanding standing to any person with Article III standing could lead to absurd results, such as a
shareholder suing an employer for employment decisions that negatively impacted the company’s
stock price. Id. at 177.
113. Id. at 178 (“Thompson is not an accidental victim of retaliation . . . . Hurting him was the
unlawful act by which the employer punished [his wife]. In those circumstances, we think
Thompson well within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII.”).
114. Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, at *1 (D.
Md. Apr. 22, 2018).
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fore, met the causation requirement of Article III standing. 115 The court
specified two allegations that “provide[d] the missing causal link” for
standing: (1) the bank steered borrowers who would have qualified for
prime loans into subprime loans, and (2) the bank approved minority borrowers for refinance when they knew, or should have known, that such borrowers would not be able to meet financial obligations. 116 Many properties
became vacant because the bank’s conduct forced borrowers to default. 117
Based on the causal connection between the City’s injuries and the defendant’s actions, the court granted standing under Article III. 118
As the Supreme Court clarified its understanding of statutory standing, 119 district courts needed to adjust accordingly. In the Los Angeles case
and in two of the three Cook County cases, the cities were granted both Article III and statutory standing, for their injuries fell within the protected
zone of the FHA. 120 In these cases, both the United States District Court for
the Central District of California and the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois relied on the Havens proposition that “standing
under the FHA [is] as broad as Article III standing.” 121 Therefore, upon
finding that the plaintiffs’ claims met constitutional standing requirements,
these courts did not undergo a separate analysis for statutory standing. 122
115. The court pointed to Gladstone for justification that, at the time of the opinion, standing
under the FHA was “as broad as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” Id. at *2 (quoting
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 108 (1979)); see also supra note 71 and
accompanying text (defining Article III standing requirements).
116. Mayor of Balt., 2011 WL 1557759, at *3. The causation analysis in Mayor of Baltimore
is in the context of Article III standing; the court did not expressly mention proximate cause. As
stated in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., “Proximate causation is
not a requirement of Article III standing, which requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly
traceable to the defendant’s conduct.” 572 U.S. 118, 134 n.6 (2014).
117. Mayor of Balt., 2011 WL 1557759, at *3.
118. Id. at *6.
119. See supra notes 80–113 and accompanying text (describing the development and application of the zone of interests test).
120. See City of L.A. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Since the Court has already found that the City has adequately alleged Article III standing, the
City’s alleged injuries fall within the FHA’s zone of interests.”); Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am.
Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 513, 520 (N.D. Ill 2015) (“In short, the County’s claims fall within the
FHA’s zone of interests . . . .”); Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d
952, 959–64 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that the County’s injuries of increased blight and decreased
tax revenue fell within the FHA’s protected zone).
121. City of L.A., 22 F. Supp. 3d at 1056; see also Cty. of Cook, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (“Congress intended to confer standing to the full extent permitted under Article III of the Constitution.”); Cty. of Cook, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (similar).
122. See City of L.A., 22 F. Supp. 3d at 1057 (“Since the Court has already found that the City
has adequately alleged Article III standing, the City’s alleged injuries fall within the FHA’s zone
of interests.”); Cty. of Cook, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (“I have already determined that the County’s
complaint satisfies Article III’s standing requirements, so there is no need to undertake a separate
zone of interests analysis.”); Cty. of Cook, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 964 (“[T]he County satisfies the requirements of Article III standing as discussed above, and, consequently, falls within the zone of
interests of the FHA.”).
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Conversely, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the third Cook
County case for lack of statutory standing, holding that urban blight and decreased tax revenue do not fall within the FHA’s zone of interests. 123 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reached a
similar conclusion in Miami’s trial court decision. 124 In these latter cases,
the district courts applied separate, more narrow analyses of statutory standing than for Article III standing. 125 For example in County of Cook v. Wells
Fargo & Co., the court relied on the assertion from Thompson that broad
statutory standing in previous cases was “ill-considered” dictum. 126 According the court, the FHA protects persons from facing discrimination
while renting, buying, or mortgaging a home; Cook County took none of
these actions. 127 Under this narrow zone of interests analysis, Cook County’s claims were dismissed. 128
C. The Supreme Court’s Proximate Cause Limits Have Led to
Inconsistent Lower Court Decisions
In addition to standing, municipalities must also demonstrate that their
claimed damages were proximately caused by the financial institutions’
lending practices. 129 Statutory claims such as those through the FHA must
meet the same standard of proximate cause as common law tort claims. 130
At issue in discriminatory lending cases is the range of damages for which a

123. Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 115 F. Supp. 3d 909, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Cook
County’s own injuries—urban blight and a reduced property tax base—while perhaps consequences of reverse redlining or equity stripping writ at large, do not bring it within [the FHA’s]
zone of interests.”). The discrepancy between this outcome and those in Cook County’s Bank of
America and HSBC cases can likely be explained by differing views of the presiding judges. For
example, the HSBC decision acknowledges a “different view [within the district] . . . that Thompson effectively overruled Gladstone in substance.” Cty. of Cook, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 964.
124. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 13-24506-CIV, 2014 WL 3342348, at *2 (S.D.
Fla., July 9, 2014). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found
that the City’s injuries fell within both Article III and statutory standing parameters. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 U.S. 1296 (2017). The
bank appealed, and the ultimate Supreme Court decision is discussed in depth in Section I.D. of
this Comment.
125. See Cty. of Cook, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 915–20 (holding that the County was not an “aggrieved” person under the FHA); City of Miami, 2014 WL 3342348, at *3–4 (determining that
Miami’s injuries fell outside the scope of the FHA).
126. Cty. of Cook, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 915 (citing Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S.
170 (2011)); see also supra note 112.
127. See Cty. of Cook, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 919 (“Cook County . . . alleges neither that it was
denied a loan nor offered unfavorable terms—setting aside the obvious point that Cook County is
not alleged to have a race or other protected trait.”).
128. Id. at 921.
129. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017) (“The remaining
question is one of causation: Did the Banks’ allegedly discriminatory lending practices proximately cause the City to lose property-tax revenue and spend more on municipal services?”).
130. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 (2014).
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municipality might try to recover. Municipalities may attempt to recover
for, inter alia, municipal expenses related to foreclosure, decreased tax revenue resulting from urban blight and decreased property values, and adverse
impacts on racial integration. 131
1. Proximate Cause in Both Statutory and Fair Housing Contexts
Typically Require Foreseeability and Directness
As stated by the Supreme Court in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 132 directness is a significant element, albeit not the sole factor, in determining proximate cause. 133 While the Supreme Court has not
defined which damages resulting from discriminatory lending meet the
proximate cause requirement under the FHA, three cases may lend insight
to the standard that municipalities must meet 134: Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply
Corp.; 135 Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York; 136 and Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. 137
First, in Anza, Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (“Ideal”) sued a competitor under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 138
(“RICO”) for failing to charge customers sales tax and subsequently filing
fraudulent tax returns to the State of New York. 139 Ideal alleged that the defendant’s failure to pay taxes allowed them to offer lower prices, which injured the plaintiff in the form of decreased sales.140 The Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting that the plaintiff failed to meet the proximate cause
requirement under the statute. 141 According to the Court, (1) the injury requires some direct relation to the conduct; (2) Ideal’s lost sales could have
been caused by a multitude of other factors; and (3) another party—the
State of New York—could better “vindicate the laws by pursuing their own
claims.” 142
131. See, e.g., Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(claiming costs incurred administering and processing foreclosures, lost property tax revenue, increased demand for county services, urban crime and blight, and racial imbalance).
132. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
133. Id. at 269.
134. See City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (invoking common law principles of proximate
cause as stated in Anza, Hemi, and Lexmark).
135. 547 U.S. 451 (2006).
136. 559 U.S. 1 (2010).
137. 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012). The statute makes it illegal for people or entities associated with interstate commerce “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
[their] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.” Id. § 1692(c).
139. Anza, 547 U.S. at 454.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 457–60.
142. Id.
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Second, Hemi illustrated the Court’s reliance on “directness” as a factor in proximate cause.143 New York City sued out-of-state cigarette sellers
under RICO for failing to provide the State with required customer information, which in turn prevented the State from sending such information to
the City; as a result, the City was unable to track down certain customers
for unpaid sales tax. 144 The Court held that this claimed injury—lost sales
tax revenue—was too remote to meet the proximate cause requirement of
RICO. 145 The defendant’s fraud was in fact committed against the State;
furthermore, the City’s injury was more a product of the customers’ actions
than those of the defendants. 146 While noting that “[t]he concepts of direct
relationship and foreseeability” contribute to common law proximate cause,
the Court’s decision in Hemi illustrates that, at least as far as RICO claims
are concerned, directness reigns supreme. 147
The third case that helps formulate the concept of statutory proximate
cause is Lexmark. 148 Lexmark, a manufacturer of printers and toner cartridges, used shrinkwrap language 149 to encourage customers to return used
cartridges to Lexmark in order to be refilled. 150 Lexmark sued Static Control, a business that supplied “remanufacturers” with toner cartridge supplies, including those originally sold by Lexmark; the remanufacturers
would then refurbish and resell the cartridges. 151 While the original suit involved a copyright dispute, Static Control issued a cross-claim alleging that
Lexmark violated the Lanham Act 152 by (1) misleading customers to think
that they were required to return the cartridges to Lexmark and (2) informing remanufacturers “that it was illegal to sell refurbished [Lexmark] cartridges.” 153 When Lexmark attempted to dismiss Static Control’s crossclaim on proximate cause grounds, the Supreme Court denied the motion. 154
In its decision, the Court noted that “the plaintiff’s injury flows directly

143. Hemi Group, LLC, 559 U.S. at 12.
144. Id. at 5–6.
145. Id. at 11 (“The City’s claim suffers from the same defect as the claim in Anza.”).
146. Id. Put in another way, “the defendant’s fraud on the third party (the State) has made it
easier for a fourth party (the taxpayer) to cause harm to the plaintiff (the City).” Id. (emphasis in
original).
147. Id. at 12.
148. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
149. Shrinkwrap language in this context refers to “terms . . . communicated to consumers
through notices printed on the toner-cartridge boxes, which advised the consumers that opening
the box would indicate consent to the terms.” Id. at 121.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). Static Control sued under § 1125(a)(1)(B), which provides a
private right of action for any person who is “likely to be damaged” by false advertising.
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 122 (quoting § 1125(a)(1)(B)).
153. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 122–23.
154. Id. at 140.
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from the [remanufacturer’s] belief in the disparaging statements.” 155 Additionally, since Static Control sold microchips that were only compatible
with Lexmark’s cartridges, there was direct correlation between the remanufacturer’s sales and Static Control’s sales. 156 The extra step between the
unlawful act and the alleged injury did not imply that the injury was too
remote, for the Static Control’s injuries were just as immediate and predictable as those of the remanufacturers. 157
The Supreme Court has considered proximate cause as it relates to the
FHA, albeit unrelated to mortgage lending practices. In Texas Department
of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., 158 the Inclusive Communities Project, a nonprofit affordable housing
corporation, filed a disparate impact suit against the Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs for its unfair distribution of low income
housing tax credits. 159 The nonprofit alleged that the state agency granted
“too many [tax] credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas
and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods.” 160 As a result of these practices, racial and income segregation increased throughout
the state. 161 The Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the plaintiffs had a valid claim under disparate impact theory. 162 Importantly, the Court clarified that disparate impact claims under the FHA must meet a “robust causality
requirement” such that racial imbalance alone cannot establish a prima facie
case. 163 Rather than relying on a statistical disparity alone, the Court required that the plaintiff must point to a specific policy or practice which
caused the inequitable outcomes. 164
2. Lower Courts Have Varied in Determining Which Effects of
Discriminatory Lending Meet Proximate Cause Requirements
Because the Supreme Court has not set concrete standards for proximate cause in discriminatory lending suits, lower courts have applied varied
155. Id. at 138.
156. Id. at 139 (“[T]here is likely to be something very close to a 1:1 relationship between the
number of refurbished [Lexmark] cartridges sold (or not sold) by the remanufacturers and the
number of [Lexmark] microchips sold (or not sold) by Static Control.”).
157. Id. at 140.
158. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
159. Id. at 2514.
160. Id.
161. Id. (“The ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing patterns
by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits . . . .”).
162. Id. at 2525–26. The Court asserted that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA because “the FHA aims to ensure that [fair housing] priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation.” Id. at 2522.
163. Id. at 2523.
164. Id.
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approaches to the topic. The United States District Court for the Central
District of California assessed proximate cause in a discriminatory lending
context in 2014, when the City of Los Angeles sued Wells Fargo for FHA
violations. 165 The City alleged that the unlawful practice resulted in lost
property tax revenue and increased municipal services. 166 The court applied
a three-pronged test for proximate cause, examining (1) if there are more
direct victims who might vindicate the law; (2) the difficulty in calculating
the damages; and (3) if “the courts will have to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.” 167 Applying
this test, the court in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co. 168 held that
the City’s damages met proximate cause requirement because they were
distinct from those of the homebuyers, they could be calculated using a Hedonic regression analysis, and there was no danger of multiple recoveries. 169
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that both economic and non-economic consequences of
discriminatory lending violations meet the pleading requirements for proximate cause. 170 The City of Philadelphia filed suit against Wells Fargo in
2017 for “reverse redlining” practices under which the bank offered less favorable and more risky loan terms to minority borrowers. 171 The City alleged two types of damages: (1) economic injuries, such as increased municipal expenses and decreased property tax revenue, and (2) non-economic
injuries, including decreased capacity for minority homeownership and
frustrated goals of integration. 172 Denying the bank’s motion to dismiss, the
court held that the non-economic injuries could plausibly have “some direct
relation” to the banks’ alleged misconduct. 173 The discriminatory practices
both negatively impacted minorities’ ability to purchase homes and reduced
overall minority homeownership. While the court had “serious concerns”
regarding the City’s ability to prove proximate cause for the economic injuries, it permitted the claim to advance past the pleading stage.174
Later in 2018, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois decided three cases brought by Cook County, Illinois against fi-

165. City of L.A. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
166. Id. at 1057.
167. Id. (quoting Or. Laborers–Emp’rs Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1999)).
168. 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
169. Id. at 1058.
170. City of Phila. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-2203, 2018 WL 424451, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
16, 2018).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *6.
174. Id.
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nancial institutions under the FHA. 175 The court evaluated proximate cause
under a “directness” standard derived from Anza, Hemi, and Lexmark, 176
meaning that damages that went beyond the “first step of the causal chain”
would not qualify for redress. 177 As a result, the district court permitted the
County to claim “direct” costs related to foreclosures, such as serving eviction notices, conducting foreclosure proceedings, and inspecting foreclosed
homes. 178 In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted
that (1) these costs flowed directly to the County, (2) no “better” plaintiff
could sue for the costs, and (3) the exact amount of damages required a
relatively simple calculation. 179 On the other hand, the court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss a number of other damages. 180 For example,
the County was not permitted to recover for the costs of social services to
foreclosed homeowners, loss of property tax revenue from foreclosed and
vacant properties, diminution of property values, diminished racial imbalance, or urban blight. 181 These types of costs could only be calculated
speculatively and ran through too many links in the chain of causation. 182
D. In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, the Court Granted the
City Standing Under the FHA but Dismissed the Claim on
Proximate Cause Grounds
In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 183 the City of Miami attempted to recover from two banks—Wells Fargo and Bank of America—
for discriminatory lending practices under the FHA. The City had sued the
175. Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Cty.
of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am.
Corp., No. 14 C 2280, 2018 WL 1561725 (N.D. Ill Mar. 30, 2018).
176. See supra notes 138–157 and accompanying text.
177. Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2018). The same
court noted that this standard “obviates the difficulty in assessing damages from indirect injuries;
avoids complicated rules for appropriating damages among several injured parties with greater or
lesser injuries; and provides the requisite level of deterrence for . . . tortfeasors.” Cty. of Cook v.
HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting RWB Servs., LLC v. Hartford Computer Grp., Inc., 539 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 2008)).
178. See, e.g., Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 962 (N.D.
Ill. 2018). The County was also permitted to recover for lost recording and transfer fees due to the
lender’s use of an electronic database in lieu of public reporting systems. Id. at 965.
179. Id. at 962; see also Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 984 (N.D.
Ill. 2018) (“Those alleged harms, despite running through an ‘intervening link of injury’ to borrowers, are ‘so integral an aspect of the violation alleged, there can be no question that proximate
cause is satisfied.’” (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
139 (2014))).
180. See, e.g., Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 962–65
(N.D. Ill. 2018) (rejecting the County’s claims for damages related to social services, decreased
property tax revenue, racial imbalance, and urban blight).
181. Id.
182. Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 988 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
183. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
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banks for “intentionally issu[ing] riskier mortgages on less favorable terms
to African-American and Latino customers.” 184 As a result, a disproportionate number of homes were foreclosed upon in nonwhite neighborhoods,
resulting in widespread vacancies and increased segregation.185 This had an
adverse impact on property values, which caused the City’s property tax
revenue to decrease. 186 Moreover, urban blight increased in those neighborhoods, forcing the City to spend extra funds on municipal services. 187
The Court addressed two issues: (1) whether a municipality has standing
under the FHA as an “aggrieved person”; and (2) whether the banks’ conduct proximately caused the injuries alleged by the City. 188
First, the Court held that the City was an “aggrieved person” under the
FHA and had standing to sue the banks for the alleged conduct. In addition
to constitutional standing requirements of Article III, Section 2, Miami
needed to show that it met the “‘statutory’ standing requirements” from
Lexmark. 189 The Court described how the term “aggrieved person” had
been interpreted broadly in past cases; standing was typically defined “as
broadly as is permitted by Article III.” 190 Previous cases have allowed
plaintiffs to sue under the FHA for being denied interracial relationships, 191
decreased tax revenues and impaired integration,192 and expenses related to
combatting racial steering practices. 193 Based on stare decisis, the Court
held that the City’s injuries fell within the “zone of interests” protected by
the FHA. 194
Second, the Court addressed whether the City’s alleged injuries were
proximately caused by the banks’ conduct. 195 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the City met proximate cause because the injuries were “foreseeable results of the banks’ misconduct,” regardless of the number of links in the causal chain. 196 The Supreme Court
184. Id. at 1301.
185. Id.
186. See Third Amended Complaint for Violations of the Fair Housing Act at 28, City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 13-cv-24508-DIMITROULEAS (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2016) (relying
on NAT’L VACANT PROPERTIES CAMPAIGN, supra note 26).
187. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1302 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.
118, 128 n.4 (2014)).
190. Id. at 1303 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)).
191. See supra text accompanying note 76.
192. See supra note 85.
193. See supra note 86. In Havens, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged “[the plaintiff organization] had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s [sic] racially
discriminatory steering practices.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)
(alteration in original).
194. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1305.
195. Id at 1305–06.
196. Id. at 1305.
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disagreed, noting that the “directness” requirement of tort principles should
control. 197 As a result, the Court held that “foreseeability alone does not
ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires.” 198 The Supreme Court declined to set precise boundaries for proximate cause under
the FHA, encouraging lower courts to create their own definitions. 199
Based on the above analysis, the Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling
and remanded for further proceedings based on the proximate cause discussion. 200
Justice Thomas dissented in part and concurred in part; he agreed that
the Eleventh Circuit erred in their proximate cause evaluation but argued
that the City of Miami should not have had standing under the FHA to
begin with. 201 After reiterating the majority’s statutory standing requirements, Justice Thomas immediately diverged from the majority’s analysis. 202 He wrote that the broad interpretation of “aggrieved person” under
older cases such as Trafficante and Gladstone had since been denounced by
Thompson, in which the Court referred to the expanded interpretations as
“ill-considered” dictum with “absurd consequences.” 203 Furthermore, typical plaintiffs under the FHA include prospective homebuyers or neighbors
who are negatively impacted by segregation; the FHA is silent on the issues
on which Miami raised its complaint. 204 Finally, the dissent raised concerns
that expanded reading of FHA standing could lead to absurd results.
Justice Thomas then agreed with the majority on the issue of proximate cause, specifically that it requires some direct relation rather than foreseeability alone. 205 Justice Thomas went a step further, stating that he
would have reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision rather than remand the

197. Id. at 1306. The Court relied on the language from Holmes, requiring “some direct relationship between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Holmes v.
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1306–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1307.
203. Id. at 1308 (quoting Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 176 (2011)).
204. Id. at 1309 (“But nothing in the text of the FHA suggests that Congress was concerned
about decreased property values, foreclosures, and urban blight, much less about strains on municipal budgets that might follow.”). Nor do the pleadings allege racial steering, which has been
found to be within the FHA’s zone of interests. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 208 (1972) (granting standing to a white tenant and a black tenant who alleged that a landlord’s discriminatory practices denied them the benefits of social integration); Gladstone, Realtors
v. Vill. Of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979) (permitting standing to plaintiffs alleging that racial
steering practices prevented them from living in an integrated society). Justice Thomas admitted
that while Gladstone does address a “budget-related injury,” it must be considered “in addition to
its racial- steering injury.” City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1310 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1311.
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case. 206 He wrote that the circuit court would be in no better position than
the Supreme Court in evaluating proximate cause, given that the case was
brought up on a motion to dismiss, leaving only the complaint to evaluate. 207 Justice Thomas underscored that the complaint would not meet a
reasonable proximate cause standard, re-stating the six step chain of events
between the banks’ conduct and the alleged injuries. 208
II. ANALYSIS
The two holdings in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami create
conflicting outcomes for cities in fair lending disputes. On one hand, the
Court reaffirmed its broad interpretation of standing under the FHA, providing an avenue for cities to litigate fair lending violations. 209 Simultaneously, however, local governments may be discouraged to bring a claim in light
of the Court’s “direct” proximate cause requirement. 210 In demanding that
cities show more than mere foreseeability of municipal damages, City of
Miami aligns with Supreme Court precedent in curbing unwieldly litigation. 211 Given the newly stated standard, subsequent lower court decisions
have favored lending institutions. 212 As a result, cities should explore alternative strategies in litigation, such as advanced data analytics, or policy,
such as vacant property registration, in order to hold financial institutions
accountable for discriminatory lending practices.213

206. Id. (“But these cases come to the Court on a motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals
has no advantage over us in evaluating the complaint’s proximate-cause theory.”).
207. Id.
208. Id. Justice Thomas wrote:
As a result of the lenders’ discriminatory loan practices, borrowers from predominantly
minority neighborhoods were likely to default on their home loans, leading to foreclosures. The foreclosures led to vacant houses. The vacant houses, in turn, led to decreased property values for the surrounding homes. Finally, those decreased property
values resulted in homeowners paying lower property taxes to the city government. Also, . . . the foreclosed upon, vacant homes eventually led to “vagrancy, criminal activity, and threats to public health and safety,” which the city had to address through expenditures of municipal resources.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brief for Respondent City of Miami at 6, City of Miami,
137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111)).
209. See infra Section II.A.
210. See infra Section II.B.
211. See infra Section II.B.
212. See infra Section II.C.
213. See infra Section II.C.
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The Court’s Decision Reaffirms Its Broad Interpretation of
Standing Under the FHA, Providing an Incentive for
Municipalities to Use the Court Systems for Related Litigation

The Supreme Court has made clear through a line of decisions that
standing under the FHA should be granted liberally. 214 While the Court had
not yet heard a municipal plaintiff challenge an institution’s lending practices under the FHA, its decision properly aligns with the holdings in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, and Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. 215 In both Gladstone and
Trafficante, the plaintiffs included individuals who were not directly
harmed but had nonetheless suffered an injury-in-fact under Article III of
the Constitution. 216 The plaintiffs lost the benefits of living an integrated
society, and they suffered economic harm as a result of racial steering practices in their neighborhood. 217 Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in Gladstone
included a village, supporting the notion that a municipality’s injuries that
derive from certain FHA violations fall within the zone of interests protected by the Act. 218 In Havens, the Court granted standing to a housing nonprofit which was unable to serve its clients and, consequently, suffered financially. 219 These cases illustrate that the Court’s understanding of
“aggrieved person” under the FHA has expanded to the fullest extent of Article III of the Constitution. 220
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of FHA standing, furthermore, is
consistent with statutory standing holdings in recent decades.221 After the
Court in Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp authorized an “enlargement” of the class of plaintiffs receiving under the zone
of interests test, numerous cases reflected this thinking. 222 For example,
Bennett v. Spear illustrates how an entire district could have standing for a
claim that a regulation, which was intended to affect ranchers, unfairly af-

214. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 3:17 (3d ed. 2014) (“In combination, Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens create a generous standing doctrine under the [FHA], a
doctrine that requires a finding of standing to the full extent permitted by Article III of the Constitution.”).
215. See supra notes 73–77, 88–101 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 73–77, 88–93 and accompanying text.
217. Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205 (considering business prospects of having diverse neighbors as
economic harm); Gladstone, 441 U.S. 91 (permitting economic manipulation of the neighborhood
and reduced property values as economic harm).
218. See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110–11 (granting standing to the village based on economic
manipulation of its neighborhoods).
219. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.
220. See supra note 83.
221. See supra Section I.B.3.
222. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); see supra notes
80–82 and accompanying text.
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fected that region’s economy. 223 The Court took a more nuanced approach
in 2011 in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP. 224 Despite saying
that it would not allow every party with Article III standing to sue under Title VII, the Court granted standing to a husband claiming that his employer
retaliated after his wife had filed a separate grievance. 225 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia explained that although the employer did not retaliate directly against the wife, her husband’s injury was still one which the
Title VII legislation was intended to prevent. 226
The Court’s trend toward expanding standing in FHA cases support
the majority’s ruling in City of Miami. First, the holdings from Trafficante,
Gladstone, and Havens indicate that an FHA plaintiff need not be the immediate recipient of misconduct. 227 Similarly, the City of Miami alleged
injuries that resulted from misconduct directed at other individuals. 228 Just
as groups and regions were granted standing for injuries related to individual statutory violations in Gladstone, Havens, and Bennett v. Spear, the City
of Miami’s claim properly fell within the Court’s expanded reading of “aggrieved persons.” 229 Furthermore, even if the Court decided to restrict its
holding to signal a shift in statutory standing after Thompson, Miami’s
claim would likely still pass muster. When the Thompson Court referred to
the expanded standing in previous cases as “ill-considered” dictum, it intended to limit statutory standing to plaintiffs whose interests fell within the
purposes of the legislation. 230 Looking at the purposes of the FHA, the City
of Miami’s injuries are likely the type which Congress intended to prevent. 231 The FHA was created to protect “those . . . [who] had an interest in
ensuring fair housing,” 232 and a municipality can demonstrate such an interest. 233
223. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); see supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 109–113.
225. Id. at 178.
226. Id.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 214–220.
228. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301–02 (2017). The premise of
the claim was that the bank’s predatory lending practice adversely impacted certain neighborhoods, which placed both an economic and social burden on the City to address the damages. Id.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 73–77 (Gladstone), 94–100 (Havens), 102–108 (Bennett).
230. Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176–77 (2011). It should be noted that the holding in Thompson,
which sought to restrict statutory standing, addressed a Title VII claim. Id. Additionally, the
Thompson Court’s concerns about Article III standing are reflected in Justice Thomas’s dissent in
City of Miami. See supra text accompanying notes 201–204.
231. See supra notes 60–61.
232. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (citing Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 1358, S.
2114, and S. 2280, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).
233. See Veronica Nicholson, Note, Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami, 44 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 147, 169–70 (2018) (citing testimonies from City of Miami that illustrate a munici-
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In his City of Miami dissent, Justice Thomas echoed the concerns
about expanded statutory standing originally raised in Thompson; however,
these concerns are misplaced. Both Justices Thomas and Scalia worried
that broad grants of standing under statutes such as the FHA would lead to a
litany of unnecessary and unfair litigation. 234 Two factors suggest that municipal standing will not lead to absurd results. First, the “zone of interests”
test limits the Court’s ability to adjudicate in statutory causes of action.
This test, first created in Ass’n of Data Processing, ensures that the Court
does not hear “generalized grievances” 235 in statutory contexts. 236 While
Justice Thomas warns of local merchants and service providers bringing
similar FHA claims on account of lost business, 237 their interests do not fall
within the zone of the FHA’s purpose because they do not have a clear interest in fair housing. 238 Second, the Court simultaneously set rigid requirements for proximate cause. 239 By stating that foreseeability alone is
not sufficient to recover for injuries under the FHA, the Court effectively
discouraged “foreseeable” yet indirect victims of foreclosures, such as local
businesses, from bringing claims because their injuries were not proximately caused by the lenders’ misconduct. 240

pality’s interest in fair housing); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015) (“The Court acknowledges the
[FHA’s] continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.”).
234. Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176–77 (“If any person injured in the Article III sense by a Title
VII violation could sue, absurd consequences would follow.”); Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1310–11 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Petitioners similarly argue that, if
Miami can sue for lost tax revenues under the FHA, then ‘plumbers, utility companies, or any other participant in the local economy could sue the Banks . . . .’” (quoting City of Miami, 137 S. Ct.
at 1304 (majority opinion))).
235. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
236. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
237. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1304 (raising the defendant’s concerns that “restaurants,
plumbers, utility companies, or any other participant in the local economy could sue the Banks to
recover business they lost when people had to give up their homes”).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 56–61. Miami raised this argument when arguing
that municipal standing would not lead to absurd results. See Jesse D.H. Snyder, No Need for Cities to Despair After Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami: How Patent Law Can Assist
in Proving Predatory Loans Directly Cause Municipal Blight Under the Fair Housing Act, 70 ME.
L. REV. 63, 74 (2017) (“Only parties with an interest in fair housing—like cities—can sue under
the FHA.” (alterations omitted) (quoting Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Justices to Consider
Scope of Fair Housing Act, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 3, 2016, 10:03 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-scope-of-fairhousing-act/)).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200.
240. See Nicholson, supra note 233, at 168 (“[B]y reeling in the standard for proximate cause
under the FHA, the majority made sure that not just anyone who foreseeably experienced financial
loss as a result of the banks’ alleged misconduct could sue under the FHA.”).
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In addition, the Court’s decision reaffirms the role of cities in protecting the rights of their citizenry, particularly in disparate impact contexts. 241
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court held that, absent a discriminatory policy, plaintiff classes cannot meet the “commonality” requirement of
Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 242 Thus, the Court
“effectively eliminated private class actions against mortgage lenders based
on alleged violations of the FHA.” 243 Following that decision, municipalities increasingly attempted to use the court system to litigate fair lending
disputes. 244 While Cleveland attempted to sue on nuisance theory, Baltimore’s case was the first in which a city alleged detrimental harm as a result
of banking practices. 245 Baltimore, in addition to Memphis and Chicago—
who had brought fair lending claims on similar bases 246—survived a significant motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 247 As a result, these cities were
able to reach “massive settlements negotiated by the U.S. Department of
Justice” against major lending institutions. 248 Lower courts subsequently
favored municipalities bringing unfair lending cases in banks. In a total of
twelve cases brought by Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, and Cook County,
ten plaintiffs were eventually granted standing. 249 As one legal expert has
noted, the decision to grant standing to Miami in the Supreme Court “affirmed progressive cities’ role in combatting housing segregation in the
United States.” 250

241. See John L. Ropiequet et al., Fair Lending Developments: Standing to Sue Takes the
Floor, 72 BUS. L. 549, 549–54 (2017) (chronicling the rise in municipal plaintiffs following WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes).
242. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011); see supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s analysis in Dukes); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (“[T]here are
questions of law or fact common to the class.”).
243. See Ropiequet et al., supra note 241, at 550.
244. Id.
245. John L. Ropiequet, Has the US Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Fair Lending Cases?, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., July 2017, at 6.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 114–117.
248. Ropiequet, supra note 245, at 6.
249. See Ropiequet, supra note 241, at 551. Three of the four Miami cases were given standing on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, and two of the three Cook County cases were granted standing in the district court. Id.
250. Mark Joseph Stern, Will Fair Housing Stay Fair?: The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Bank
of America v. City of Miami Strengthened the Fair Housing Act—for Now, SLATE (May 1, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/05/in-bank-of-america-v-miami-the-supreme-courtstrengthens-the-fair-housing-act.html.
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B. The City of Miami Ruling that Proximate Cause Requires More
than “Foreseeability” May Discourage Unfair Lending Litigation,
but It Aligns with FHA Precedent
The Court’s second holding in City of Miami—that proximate cause
for damages in fair lending cases requires more than foreseeability
alone 251—is consistent with precedent in both the Supreme Court and district courts. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit erred by using foreseeability to evaluate proximate cause; it instead required that the
lower court use the “directness” standard from tort principles.252 The Court
declined to provide further guidance on the issue for lower courts, intending
for those courts to set the limits of proximate cause in light of both foreseeability and directness. 253
This more stringent proximate cause standard, in contrast with the
aforementioned standing holding, may discourage cities from using court
systems to recover for the municipal costs of discriminatory lending. Many
legal analysts have noted that the decision makes the standing win a “Pyrrhic victory” due to the more rigid causation requirements. 254 While the
path to standing might be more direct, “uncertainty in proving causation
may lead cities to forego suing under the [FHA].” 255 The decision, difficult
as it may appear to cities, does align with causation precedent.
First, the Supreme Court has held that in statutory causes of action,
and particularly in FHA claims, causation requires more than foreseeability.
The Court in both Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. and Hemi Group, LLC
v. City of New York indicated that, at least as far as statutory fraud cases are
concerned, some direct relationship is required between the alleged misconduct and ensuring harm. 256 This standard both ensures that no intervening
cause accounts for the harm and that the defendant’s harm is best remedied
by the particular plaintiff. 257 Furthermore, the Lexmark International, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc. decision indicates that if there are multiple steps in the chain of causation, those steps should carry predictable and
proportional harms. 258 In a FHA context, the Court in Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. held
251. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305–06 (2017).
252. See supra notes 195–200 (describing the Court’s analysis of proximate cause).
253. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
254. Ropiequet, supra note 245, at 9; see also Snyder, supra note 238, at 78 (citing commentary by legal experts who felt that the proximate cause holding gives cities a difficult standard to
meet).
255. Snyder, supra note 238, at 78 (citing Stern, supra note 250).
256. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006); Hemi Group, LLC v. City of
New York, 559 U.S. 1, 11 (2010); see also supra text accompanying notes 138–147.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 138–147.
258. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 140 (2014); see
also supra text accompanying notes 156–157.
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that while the FHA may be used to litigate disparate impact claims, plaintiffs must meet a “robust causality requirement.” 259 Similar to the WalMart decision, this outcome indicates that plaintiffs must be able to trace
damages directly to a particular policy or decision. 260 The stringent causality standard would, therefore, ward off unnecessary litigation. 261
Similarly, by limiting fair lending claims to those with at least some
direct relationship with the alleged misconduct, the Court signifies an intent
to permit recovery only when an injury can be traced to the harm. 262 The
ruling in City of Miami both limits judicial abuse and simplifies damage
calculations. Additionally, the rule aligns with the precedent set through
Anza, Hemi, and Lexmark, since the Court has clearly required that proximate cause for statutory causes of action requires at least some direct connection. 263 The Eleventh Circuit—the only court of appeals to rule on this
issue—used a foreseeability standard when evaluating proximate cause. 264
In developing this standard, the Eleventh Circuit cited to Gladstone and
Havens to show that direct harm need not be pleaded in order to bring an
FHA claim. 265 These cases, however, serve to determine standing under the
FHA 266 and should not be used to establish limits for proximate cause as it
relates to disparate impact and fair lending.
C. After City of Miami, the Trends in Lower Courts’ Interpretation of
Proximate Cause Favor the Lenders, Meaning Cities Might Explore
Alternative Options to Hold Banks Accountable
The City of Miami Court’s standing and proximate cause rulings arguably “[give] ammunition to both sides in litigation between cities and banks
under the [FHA] over the impact of predatory lending practices on local

259. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2523 (2015).
260. See John L. Ropiequet, The Supreme Court Doubles Down on the Causation Requirement for Fair Lending Cases, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 219, 219–20 (2017) (describing
Dukes and Inclusive Communities as precursors to the City of Miami outcome).
261. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2512 (“These limitations are also necessary to protect defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims.”).
262. See Ropiequet, supra note 260, at 236 (“Dukes, Inclusive Communities, and City of Miami . . . stressed the importance of evidence of a strong causal connection between the lenders’
acts and discriminatory effects on borrowers.”).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 256–259.
264. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (“The Eleventh Circuit grounded its decision on the theory that proximate cause under the FHA is ‘based on foreseeability’ alone. . . . [No] other court of appeals weighed in on this issue.” (quoting City of Miami
v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 U.S. 1296)).
265. City of Miami, 800 F.3d at 1281.
266. See supra Section II.B.
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communities.” 267 While the Court’s broad standing requirements might encourage a city to use litigation to settle disputes with financial institutions,
the stringent causation standard might serve as a deterrent. 268 Furthermore,
municipalities will keep an eye on both settlement discussions and litigation
in lower courts around the country. While many cases prior to City of Miami focused on standing, lower courts will now be tasked to determine
which sorts of injuries can be directly linked to the alleged misconduct. 269
Following the City of Miami decision, few courts have ruled on which
municipal injuries might be proximately caused by discriminatory lending. 270 The outcomes have favored financial institutions. In all three Cook
County cases, the district court concluded that most of the County’s alleged
injuries did not meet the directness standard. 271 In the suits against HSBC
and Wells Fargo, for example, the court denied the motions to dismiss
claims for expenses related to foreclosure proceedings, but dismissed
claims related to lost tax revenue, increased blight, increased social services, and the like. 272 While the costs related to foreclosure proceedings
were “within the first step of injury,” the vast majority of other claims “depended on a multitude of factors” 273 and required “difficulty in measuring
and apportioning.” 274
Meanwhile, City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co. might represent
a beacon of hope for cities at the pleading stage, although lending institutions might find comfort in the likely merits of the case. 275 The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that non-economic injuries, such as frustrated
integration goals, could have a direct relationship to the bank’s lending
practices because they may have impaired minorities’ ability to purchase

267. Tony Mauro, SCOTUS Decision May Fuel Suits Against Banks, LAW.COM, (May 21,
2017)
https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/05/01/scotus-decision-may-fuel-suits-againstbanks/.
268. Id.
269. See Ropiequet, supra note 245, at 9.
270. Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am. Corp., No 14 C 2280, 2018 WL 1561725, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 30, 2018); Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill.
2018); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
271. See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text.
273. Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
274. Id.; see also Cty. of Cook, 2018 WL 1561725, at *5 (holding that “both the contingent
nature of the county’s injuries . . . as well as their temporal and causal remoteness” justify dismissal); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (noting that
damage calculation would require “the very kind of ‘massive and complex damages litigation’
against which the Supreme Court has strongly cautioned” (quoting Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of
Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017))).
275. City of Phila. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-2203, 2018 WL 424451, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
16, 2018); see supra text accompanying notes 170–174 (describing Philadelphia’s claim and the
court’s holding).
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homes. 276 In reaching this decision, the district court opted not to rule on
proximate cause for economic injuries such decreased tax revenue. 277 The
court did, however, caution that it had “serious concerns” regarding proximate cause for these injuries on the merits, which might further deter the
use of litigation to resolve these disputes. 278 Proximate cause for the ripple
effects of discriminatory lending will likely be difficult to prove on the merits in other pending cases around the nation. 279
Municipalities attempting to recover for foreclosure—and blightrelated damages from unfair lending—may need to examine alternative litigation or policy-based solutions. First, cities might explore innovative litigation strategies to more closely connect their injuries to the discriminatory
banking practices. Data and expert analysis may be used to demonstrate a
more predictable and close connection between lending practices and urban
blight. 280 As early as Baltimore City’s case against Wells Fargo, the City
used Hedonic regression analyses to plead “precise quantification of the injury to the City caused by Defendants’ discriminatory lending practices.” 281
While Baltimore only needed to show a fairly traceable relationship between the bank’s conduct and the City’s alleged injuries, 282 similar calculations might be used for proximate cause pleadings.
As the Supreme Court held, the presence of a one to one relationship
between cause and result can mitigate concerns about extra “steps” in the
causal chain. 283 Techniques that eliminate intervening and contributing
causes of blight, therefore, can benefit cities in meeting proximate cause
standards. As seen in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., where the
district court used a proximate cause standard rooted in both directness and
foreseeability, advanced data can illustrate a connection between actions
and results. 284 Specifically, the court noted how “the City alleges that Defendants’ contribution can be parceled out from the losses attributable to
non-Wells Fargo foreclosures and other causes through Hedonic regression

276. City of Phila., 2018 WL 424451, at *6.
277. Id. (“Because the City plausibly pleads proximate cause for its non-economic injuries, the
question of whether it also adequately pleads proximate cause for its economic injuries need not
be reached at this juncture.”).
278. Id.
279. See Ropiequet, supra note 260, at 232 (“Similarly, when the Atlanta, Miami Gardens,
Cook County, and Philadelphia cases reach that stage . . . it is unlikely that the cases will survive
summary judgment.”).
280. See Snyder, supra note 238, at 83–85.
281. Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra
note 17, at 107.
282. See supra notes 114–118 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text (referring to the direct correlation between the sales of the remanufacturing company and the plaintiff).
284. See supra notes 166–169.
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analysis.” 285 Courts have increasingly permitted regression analyses to
show damages, but they are subject to strict Daubert standards and can be
excluded for even slightly unsupported assumptions. 286 The combination of
advanced economic statistics and expert witnesses might nevertheless get
the issue of proximate cause to a jury. 287
If litigation ultimately proves fruitless in this regard, cities will need to
explore policy options to hold lenders accountable for unfair lending practices. For example, cities could force lenders to be accountable for vacant
property upkeep through vacant property registration (“VPR”).288 This process can require lenders to register a property at the time of foreclosure or
after a property has been vacant for a term. 289 Chula Vista, California, became one of the first localities to enforce VPR on lending institutions. 290
Mandated by ordinance, lenders must inspect a home ten days after initial
notice of foreclosure; and if the property is vacant, the lender “must then
register with the city and is required to maintain the property to a specified
community standard.” 291 The city is subsequently able to collect taxes, impose fines, and place priority liens on the property. 292 Such a process, while
not a comprehensive method to recover all foreclosure-related damages,
might at least keep institutions accountable for blighted and nonpaying
properties.
III. CONCLUSION
Ever since Baltimore City survived a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing in its fair lending litigation against Wells Fargo and Bank of
America, lower courts have authored inconsistent decisions regarding mu-

285. City of L.A. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]he
City alleges that Defendants’ contribution can be parceled out from the losses attributable to nonWells Fargo foreclosures and other causes through Hedonic regression analysis.”); cf. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 U.S. 1296 (2017)
(“[T]he City has provided the results of regression analyses that purport to draw the connection
between the Bank’s conduct toward minority borrowers, foreclosure, and tax revenue.”); see also
Snyder, supra note 238, at 84 (“If economic statistics show that one act drove economic downturn, then a jury should be able to hear that testimony.”).
286. See generally Jeff Todd & R. Todd Jewell, Dubious Assumptions, Economic Models, and
Expert Testimony, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279 (2018). In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Court clarified the “gatekeeping role of the [trial] judge” in admitting reliable and relevant expert testimony. Id. at 597. According to this principle, judges should
admit “[p]ertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles.” Id.
287. Snyder, supra note 238, at 84–86.
288. FRANK S. ALEXANDER, CTR. FOR CMTY. PROGRESS, LAND BANKS AND LAND BANKING
38 (2d ed. 2015).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 39; CHULA VISTA, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.60.040 (2018).
291. ALEXANDER, supra note 288, at 39.
292. Id.
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nicipal standing and proximate cause under the FHA. 293 In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, the Supreme Court stated that while municipalities have standing to sue banks for unfair lending practices under the FHA,
mere foreseeability is insufficient to establish proximate cause.294 The
Court properly stated that the historically broad reading of statutory standing under the FHA should include municipalities. 295 Additionally, its mandate that proximate cause include some element of directness aligns with
precedent in both fair housing and similar statutory contexts. 296 This decision may appear to benefit both sides in discriminatory lending litigation,
but the stringent proximate cause standards might discourage cities from using the courts to settle similar disputes. 297 Moving forward, municipalities
may need to explore alternative litigation strategies or policy solutions to
hold banks accountable for discriminatory lending practices. 298

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See Ropiequet, supra note 245, at 6–7.
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.

